ID2S Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols
Abstract
ID2S Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols. In this paper, we present two compilers that transform any two-party PAKE protocol to a two-server PAKE protocol on the basis of the identity-based cryptography, called ID2S PAKE protocol. By the compilers, we can construct ID2S PAKE protocols which achieve implicit authentication.
Compared with the Katz et al.’s two-server PAKE protocol with provable security without random oracles, our ID2S PAKE protocol can save from 22 to 66 percent of computation in each server.So far, two models have existed for authenticated key exchange.
These keysare random and hard to remember. In practice, a user often keeps his keys in a personal device protected by a password/PIN.
Another model assumes that users,without helpofpersonal devices,areonly capableofstoring“human-memorable”passwords. Bellovin and Merritt were the first to introduce password-based authenticated key exchange (PAKE), where two parties, based only on their knowledge of a password, establish a cryptographic key by exchange of messages.
Conclusion
In this ID2S Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Protocolsa .
we present two efficient compilers to transform any two-party PAKE protocol to an ID2S PAKE protocol with identity-based cryptography.
In addition, we have provided a rigorous proof of security for our compilers without random oracle.
Our compilers are in particular suitable for the applications of password-based authentication where an identity-based system has already been established.
Our future work is to construct an identity-based multiple-server PAKE protocol with any twoparty PAKE protocol.
