Mitigating Denial of Service Attacks in OLSR Protocol Using Fictitious Nodes
Abstract
Mitigating Denial of Service Attacks in OLSR Protocol Using Fictitious Nodes.With the main focus of research in routing protocols for Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks (MANET) geared towards routing efficiency, the resulting protocols tend to be vulnerable to various attacks. Over the years, emphasis has also been placed on improving the security of these networks. Different solutions have been proposed for different types of attacks, however, these solutions often compromise routing efficiency or network overload.
A number of different routing algorithms exist for network packet transmission. For the most part these algorithms can be classified into two main categories: reactive routing and proactive routing protocols.
In the case of proactive (table-driven) protocol, for example, DSDV and OLSR, every node constantly maintains a list of all possible destinations in the network and the optimal paths routing to it.
Reactive protocols, such as DSR and AODV, find a route only on demand.
Irrespective of routing algorithm, one of MANET’s essential requirements of
and a factor in its success is its ability of having all nodes recognized by other participants, even in motion.
These algorithms differ from the standard routing used in classic networks due to frequent topology changes.
Conclusion
In this Mitigating Denial of Service Attacks in OLSR Protocol Using Fictitious Nodes paper, we have presented a solution called DCFM whose function is to prevent a node isolation attack in which the attacker manipulates the victim into appointing the attacker as a sole MPR, giving the attacker control over the communication channel. We further strengthened the attack by giving the attacker the ability to follow the victim around.
DCFM is unique in that all the information used to protect the MANET stems from the victim’s internal knowledge, without the need to rely on a trusted third party.
In addition, the same technique used for the attack is exploited in order to provide protection.
By learning local topology and advertising fictitious nodes, a node is able to deduce suspect nodes
and refrain from nominating them as a sole MPR, thus, side-stepping the essential element of the attack.
